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. INTRODUCTION

The Koran's proscription against borrowing or lending with interest has
taken on greater significance in recent years with the expansion of Islamic
fundamentalism in many parts of the world. Since the mid-1970s, in an
effort to tap into a potentially huge capital market, Islamic banks and financial
houses have structured several basic securities designed to bypass the ban on
interest. Until recently, these securities have met the needs of both users and
suppliers of capital, but it has become increasingly apparent that the Islamic
capital markets are insufficiently developed to meet the demand for mediumand long-term capital in the comingyears. Without a mechanism to tap into
and lend such capital, many financing needs, particularly in the area of
infrastructure finance, will go unmet. In an effort to satisfy this need while
accessing and profiting from potentially huge pools of capital, both Islamic
Ariel Berschadsky received a B.S.F.S. in Development Economics from the Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service, an M.BA in Finance and Operations Research from the University
of Chicago Graduate School of Business, and aJ.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center. He
isan associate in the corporate division of White & Case, L.L.P., in New York.
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financial institutions and the Islamic branches of western institutions have
begun developing new financial structures.
This article will discuss Islam's prohibition against interest, the development of modern Islamic finance, the standard financial instruments that have
been in use for the past three decades, and several innovative financial
structures that have already begun to transform modern Islamic finance by
increasing the size and extending the maturity structure of Islamic loans.
II. THE PROHIBITION OF USURY IN IsLAMIC LAW

In the early part of the seventh century, in the small oasis town of Mecca
off the main trade route from Yemen to Syria, the Prophet Muhammad
began campaigning against the local idols and converting the populace to his
new monotheistic religion, Islam.' The revelations he claimed to have
received from God were later transcribed into what became the Koran, which
gave adherents to Islam
a comprehensive code of conduct encompassing all
2
aspects of their lives.
One of the Koran's strongest rules forbids lending and borrowing for
interest, riba, stating that "[t] hose that live on Riba... shall rise up before
God like men whom Satan has demented by his touch . . . ."' Several
additional verses, or Sura, in the Koran also ban riba,4 including one that
commands "[n]o profit without toil and no money without labor. Man hath
only that for which he has put forth effort." s Finally, there are several
narrations of the sayings and behavior of Muhammad, the Hadith, that deal
with interest.6 In two of these, it is reported that Muhammad equated the
taking and giving of interest to committing adultery thirty-six times or
committing incest with one's mother.7
Despite the prohibition ofriba, the term was never clearly defined and no
examples were provided in the Koran.' To this day, it remains unclear
whether the term riba, which is derived from the Arabic root meaning "to

I
(1991).
2
3
4

See PETERW. WILSON, A QuESTION OF INTEREST: THE PARALYSIS OF SAUDI BANKING 13

See id.
KORAN 2:275.
See BANKING TRAINING CENTRE, CENTRAL BANK OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN,

ISLAMIC BANKING 7-9 (Habib Shirazi ed. & trans., Butterworths 1990).
s

J.W. WRIGHTJR., UNivERsrry OF DURHAM CENTRE FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND ISLAMIC

STUDIES, ISLAMIC BANKING IN PRACTICE: PROBLEMS INJORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA 7 (1995) (quoting
SURA 53:39-40).
6
See WILSON, supra note 1, at 14.
7
See id. at 13 (quoting ABDALLA BIN HANZALLAH & HADITH ABU HURAYA, HADITH).

a

See id. at 13-14.
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grow" or "to be in excess," covers all forms of interest or refers only to
exorbitant usury. 9 During this century, a variety of interpretations of the
prohibition against riba have emerged under Islamic Law, or Shariah.'° The
Modernist interpretation, which is the least restrictive, maintains that riba is
equivalent to the English term "usury," which is the charging of excessive
interest, and notjust the charging of any interest. 1 This is based on the belief
that the true spirit of the ban on riba is the goal of preventing exploitation of
the weak.' 2 The interpretation of the Zahiris school also tries to narrow the
scope of the ban on riba by limiting its application to the six commodities
specifically mentioned in the Koran - gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates, and
salt.' 3 Other interpretations, offered by Hanafis, Ja'firi, and some Sh'ia
jurists, maintain that a Muslim may engage in interest-bearing transactions
but only in non-Islamic countries and only with a non-Muslim. 4 Finally,
the Fundamentalist interpretation of riba is that all interest-bearing
transactions are forbidden in all circumstances.' The paying of interest on
money is believed to lead to selfishness, violating the Islamic injunction of
brotherhood. 6 The Fundamentalist interpretation, because it is the most
widely followed approach in the Middle East today, will serve as the
backdrop for this article.'
IMl. DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN ISLAMIC FINANCE
Islamic finance has its roots in the camel caravans that used to traverse
the Arabian deserts. 8 Wealthy merchants would provide money for traders

9

to

See id. at 14.

See Chibli Mallat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth CenturyJurisprudence,in ISLAMIC

LAW AND FINANCE 69,69 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).

n

See David A.Suratgar, The Impact ofIslamicBanking on World Financialand Commercial Relations,

16 LAw& POL YINT'L Bus. 1089,1102 n.31 (1984).
12
See ABDULIAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTEREST: A STUDYOFTHE PROHIBMON OF
RIaA AND ITS CONTEMPORARY INTERPRErATION 41(1996).
3
See NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW: RIBA,
GHARARANDISLAMICBANKING 15 (2nd ed. 1992); seealso FuADAL-OMAR&MOHAMMEDABDEL-HAQ,

(1996).
See SALEH, supra note 13, at 40-41.
SeeAL-OMAR&ABDEL-HAQ,supra note 13,at7. This interpretation isalso known as the "neo-

ISLAMIC BANKING: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND CHALLENGES 9
14

Is

Revivalist view." See SAEED, supra note 12, at 41.
16

ELIAS G. KAZARIAN, ISLAMIC VERSUS TRADITIONAL BANKING: FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN

EGYPT 51. (1993). Some Islamic scholars have tried to give a modem justification for the ban on interestbased lending, claiming that it tends to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few. See id.
17
See id.
is
See Banks Find Niche in Islamic World Interest is Barred in Those Countries,but Banks Still Turn
Profits, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Dec. 8, 1997, at 4D, available at 1997 WL 7137507.
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to buy and transport goods, profiting from a successful caravan or losing if
the caravan got lost or robbed during itsjourney.1 9 Partnerships such as these
were acceptable because Shariah, though prohibiting payment or receipt of
any interest on loans of money, permits and actually encourages the
allocation ofrisks and rewards and sharing in the resulting profits or losses.2"
Such partnerships are seen as a means to facilitate an entrepreneur's ability
to transform unproductive resources into productive ones.21
Islamic finance developed rapidly during the 1970s.2 Until then, the
average Muslim held few liquid assets and those he did hold, if he entrusted
them to a bank at all, were placed there for safekeeping only - no interest
or other financial return was paid.2 3 The wealthy few, on the other hand,
discreetly directed their investable funds to conventional banks paying
interest.24 The oil boom of the 1970s changed this situation, as higher oil
prices led to a huge influx of capital into the oil-producing countries of the
Middle East.2' Suddenly much more money was in many more hands, and
the average depositor with surplus savings began to demand something in
return while still conforming to Shariah.26 Under Shariah,the only method
to accomplish these dual objectives was to make lenders share in the risk of
the venture to which they lent their capital. 2 To attract more of these new
investors, banks began offering profit sharing, and developed a variety of
Islamically acceptable financial instruments to channel these new funds into
activities requiring capital.28
19

See id.

See Nicholas B. Angell & Emad H. Khalil, Projett Financing: InfrastructureOffers Opportunitiesto
Combine ConventionalandIslamic Finance,21 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP.9 (1998), availableat WL 21 No.
0

7 MEEXREP 9.
21
2
23

See WRIGHT, supra note 5,at 9.
See Kirk Albrecht, Turningtie Prophet's Words into Profits,
Bus.WK.,Mar. 16, 1998, at 46.
See Banks Find Niche in Islamic World Interest is Barred in Tlse Countries, but Banks Still Turn

Profits,supra note 18. There had been some previous attempts to provide returns to depositors in Islamic
banks - aMalaysian savings plan in the 1940s to finance the pilgrimage to Mecca; abank established in
Pakistan in the late 1950s; and the Mitr Ghams Savings Bank chartered in Egypt in 1963 - but all these
attempts ended in failure. See WRIGHT, supra note 5,at 7-8.
2

See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAWAND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK,

AND RETURN 5 (Arab and Islamic Laws Series, 1998).
25
See id.; Albrecht, supra note 22, at 46.
26
See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 5. The first wave of successful Islamic banks was
established in: Saudi Arabia (Islamic Development Bank in 1974); Dubai (Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975);
Sudan (Faisal Islamic Bank in 1977); Egypt (Faisal Bank of Egypt in 1977); Kuwait (Kuwait Finance
House in 1977); Jordan (Jordanian Islamic Bank in 1978); and Bahrain (Bahrain Islamic Bank in 1979).
See WRIGHT. supra note 5, at 8.
27
See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 9.
20
See IslamicBanking- A PromisingMaredforConventionalBanks, DRESDNER BANK TRENDS, Apr.

1,1996, at 11,availableat 1996 WL 9663140.
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Today, there is a large amount of capital invested according to Shariahby one estimate nearly $70 billion.2 With over a billion Muslims throughout
the world, greater capital mobility," and Islamic fundamentalism on the
rise,3 1 there is an ever-larger supply of untapped Islamic assets.32 Countries
such as Iran, Sudan, and Pakistan have actually banned traditional
commercial banking altogether and imposed Islamic banking models on their
people, further increasing the supply of Islamic capital.33 Institutional
investors represent yet another source of capital that is increasingly being
channeled into the Islamic markets in search of higher returns.'
To tap into this capital, the next stage of growth in the Islamic financial
markets will be the continued development of financial securities designed
to comport with Shariah. Traditional Shariah-based retail commercial
banking activity has relied on a limited array of financial instruments, yet it
is difficult to profitably engage in retail commercial banking in a religiously
acceptable manner.35 Islamic commercial banking as it has been practiced
over the last two decades will be increasingly unable to intermediate between
the growing pool of capital on the one hand and the increased need for
financing in Middle Eastern countries on the other. The answer for Islamic
commercial banks is to diversify away from their traditional retail mode and
engage in more flexible forms of financial intermediation.3
IV. STANDARD SHARL4H-BASED FINANCAL INSTRUMENTS

A. The Murabaha
The most common Shariah-based financial instrument for short-term
financing is the murabaha,also known as cost plus financing, which accounts
for about 75% ofIslamic finance transactions. 37 Under murabaha,the Islamic
bank buys goods or commodities based on the client's specifications and then
resells them with transfer of title to the client at a predetermined markup on
29

See Islamic Finance, Islamic Windows of Opporlunity, PROJECT &TRADE FIN., Nov. 10, 1998, at

16, available at 1998 WL 10129419.
See Zamir Iqbal, Islamic Banking Gains Momentum, Expands Markets and Competes With
Conventional Banking in Arab Staies, 21 MIDDLE E. ExEc. REPORTS 9 (1998), available at WL 21 No.1
MEEXREP 9.
31
See Albrecht, supra note 22, at 46.
30

32
33
34
35
3
37

See Islamic Finance, Islamic Windows of Opportunity, supra note 29, at 16.
See Albrecht, supra note 22, at 46.
See ldamic Finance, Islamic Windows of Opportunity, supra note 29, at 16.
See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 292.
Seeid. at 293.
See Islamic Finance, Islamic Windows of Opportunity, supra note 29, at 17.
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the purchase cost. The payment can be done in installments,39 on a
deferred basis (bay mu aflaD),' or through pre-payment with deferred delivery
(bay salam).4 The murabaha is essentially identical to Western-style interestbearing securities because financing on the basis of a price mark-up is no
different than charging interest.42 An additional benefit to banks is that
returns are short-term and highly predictable. 43
There are several misconceptions about the murabaha contract as it
actually operates. First, according to Shariah, in the murabaha it is the
financier's responsibility to locate and purchase the required goods at the best
price and if the client is not pleased with the quality or price of the goods he
can void the contract."4 But the ability of the client to void the contract in
practice is a fiction. Islamic financiers phrase their contracts in such a way
that they avoid any risk related to the goods.4' For example, the client must
assume responsibility for stating the correct specifications so that a financier
who has purchased the correct goods is protected.' The client, in many
cases, even has to provide the suppliers' names.47 Furthermore, the client's
ability to renege is decreased by forfeitable security deposits, advance
payments, and third party guarantees.48 The second ostensible difference
between murabaha and Western-style interest bearing securities is that in the
murabaha, the financier assumes the initial risk of storage and transit of the
product from the supplier to the client.49 Again, this risk in practice is
nonexistent because financiers simply purchase insurance and pass the cost
on to the client.50 Third, the financier supposedly bears the risk of untimely
repayment because the amount of the mark-up remains unchanged even
though the financier loses the time value of the money he has lent.5" Yet this

3

See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9. The mark-up generally reflects the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR). See Moin A Siddiqi, Banking on Principles,THE MIDDLE EAST, May 1, 1997, at
26. available at 1997 WL 9741931.
9
See Richard Freeland, Ways to Lend Without InterestMany Moslems are Proud of Their Approach to
Finance but are Bemused by Western Criticism, EUROMONEY, May 1998, at 118.
40
See Iqbal, supra note 30, at 9.
41
42

See id.
See SAEED,supra note 12, at 93. But note that murabaha cannot be used to finance services, only

goods. See id.
43
See id. at 87.
44
See AL-OMAR &ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 16.
45
See SAEED, supra note 12, at 85-86.

46
4

See id. at 85.
See id.

48

See id. at 86.
See AL-OMAR & ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 15-16.
See SAEED, supra note 12, at 85.
See AL-OMAR &ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 15-16.

4
s
s1
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too presents no problem for financiers because they simply impose fines
based on the opportunity cost of capital onto procrastinating debtors. S2 Thus
it is apparent that "in their investment operations, Islamic banks seem to
regard an outward conformity to Islamic legal injunctions as the most
important determinant of the islamicity of their operations .... , 3
B. The jara
The next most common financial instrument, accounting for about 10%
of Islamic finance transactions, is the ijara.s4 The Yara is a medium to longterm leasing structure in which the Islamic bank purchases the asset,
generally equipment or real estate, and leases it back to the investor for an
agreed period of time and rental payment. s The Yara differs little from the
standard Western lease' except for the requirement that the lessor be
responsible for maintenance and insurance, which in a standard Western
lease is generally the lessee's responsibility." At the end of the term, the asset
either reverts back to the bank, the basic ijara, or the lessee exercises his
5s
option to acquire it, the ijara wa-iktina.
C. Others
The mudaraba and musharaka are the remaining Shariah-based financial
instruments of significance.59 The mudaraba is a partnership agreement in
which the investor, the rab al-maal, entrusts capital to an agent, the mudarib,
who then uses the money to purchase, store, insure, market, and sell goods.'
The principal is subsequently returned to the investor, usually within a
year.61 The investor supplies the capital but takes no part in the operation of
32

See SAEED, supra note 12, at 87.

S3

54

Id. at 92.
See Islamic Finance,Islamic Windows ofOpportunity,supra note 29, at 17.

ss

See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 190.

SG

See NICHOLAS DYLAN RAY, ARAB ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 37

n.84 (Arab and Islamic Laws Series, 1995).
s7

See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 191.

See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9. The risks to the financier ofowning the asset are offset
by making it the owner of the asset without actually having title to it. A blind trust is created in which
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) holds title to the asset while the financier has the beneficial interest. The
financier puts in 60-70% ofthe funds and the investor puts in the remaining 30-40%. See Sara Khalili,
Unlocking lslamicFinance,INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., Apr. 1, 1997, at 19; William G. Shepherd,Jr., Integrating
Islamic & Western Finance, GLOBAL FIN., May 1996, at 50.
so

s9

See RAY, supra note 56, at 37 n.84.

60
61

See SAEED, supra note 12, at 56.
See Siddiqi, supra note 38, at 26.
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the venture.62 The agent invests only his human capital and does not obtain
any wage for conducting the business.' Profit sharing is predetermined,'
but fixed amounts of profits to any party are prohibited. 65 Losses are borne
solely by the investor.' Banks use the mudarabastructure as the primary way
to obtain assets from depositors.67
The musharaka is similar to the mudarabain that both financier and client
contribute capital and share the profits on a predetermined basis.6 However,
in the musharaka, losses are borne in proportion to the investment.69
Although there are three varieties of musharaka,70 the commercial musharaka
is the most common.7 1 The commercial musharaka is generally used for a
specific, short-term
purpose, such as the purchase and sale of a machine or
2
a commodity.7
The mudaraba and musharaka structures, however, are not well suited to
modern economies. 73 First, the increased costs to bankers of having to
exercise constant vigilance over the utilization offunds makes these forms of
lending the least profitable.74 Second, particularly in the case ofmudaraba,the
bank's profits are uncertain given their dependence on the venture's
success.7 Third, even the entrepreneurs who need financing find these
structures undesirable because they do not want to give up any of their
anticipated profits. 6
62

See BANKING TRAINING CENTRE, supranote 4, at 32. Actually, because the mudaraba is for the

purchase of specified goods, the bank itself often makes the payment directly to the seller. See SAEED,
supra note 12, at 56.
63
See AL-OMAR &ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 12.
(A
Often this determination is based on conventional interest-rate tables. See Freeland, supra note
39, at 118.
See Iqbal, supra note 30, at 9.
See Islamic Finance,Islamic Windows of Opportunity, supra note 29,at 26. Losses sustained due to
the negligence of the mudarib, however, are borne by him. See Siddiqi, supra note 38, at 26.
67
See, e.g., RAY, supra note 56, at 35; SAEED, supra note 12, at 101.
"
See Islamic Finance,Islamic Windows of Oppoflunity, supra note 29, at 26.
69
See id.
70
See SAEED, supra note 12, at 62. They are commercial, decreasing participation, and permanent
participation. See id.
7'
See id. at 65.
7
See id. at63.
7
See id. at72.
's

74

See id.

See AL-OMAR & ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 13-14. See also
RAY, supra note 56, at 35 (using
the mudaraba structure to lend their capital is risky for banks because they bear all the risk, giving the agent
the incentive to make high-risk, high-return investments).
76
See AL-OMAR & ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 13, at 14; see also SAEED, supra note 12, at 72 (noting
heightened bank involvement discourages entrepreneurs who seek maximum freedom of maneuver in
the use of borrowed funds).
75
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V. TRADITIONAL IsLAMIC SECURITIES INCAPABLE OF CHANNELING
SUFFICIENT LONG-TERM CAPITAL TO MEET GROWING DEMAND

Despite progress over the last few decades, Shariah-based commercial
bank lending remains short-term in nature and is generally directed to
activities such as trade and commodity financing."n This phenomenon is
driven by several factors. First, Islamic banks obtain the bulk of their assets
through deposits, which are typically short-term given the depositors' natural
risk aversion in less developed economies. 8 The short-term nature of
investor deposits is reinforced by the Shariah requirement that depositors
essentially become equity investors in their banks, something they are
understandably reluctant to do.' The consequence of short-term deposits
is the inability of banks to engage in longer-term lending given the need to
maintain balance between the maturity structure of assets and liabilities.
Second, the pressure on Islamic commercial banks to remain liquid by
making primarily short-term loans is compounded by their inability to
borrow on interest from a central bank, leaving them without a lender of last
resort during liquidity crunches." The need to remain liquid is reinforced
by an absence of deposit insurance programs in Islamic countries that would
reassure savers and help prevent runs on bank deposits.8 ' Third, the absence
of an interbank market in the Islamic countries prevents banks from
swapping short-term deposits in favor of longer-term assets, as is done
routinely in the west.8 2 Fourth, most small business owners try to avoid
taking out long-term loans from Islamic banks because this would require
management participation by the bank and a consequent loss of control to the
owners.8

"

See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9; see also Islamic Finance,Islamic Windows ofpportunity.

supra note 29, at 12.
7
See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9; see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 8.
79
See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 8.
O
See RAY, supra note 56, at 22.
S1
See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 8.
2
Malaysia is the only Muslim country with an interbank market. It was developed in 1994 with
substantial government support. See Khalili, supra note 58, at 19.
3
In one study, only 13% of small and medium-sized business owners in Saudi Arabia were
amenable to the idea of bank participative financing. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 27 (citing Bandar AlHaijar &John R. Presley, Islamic Finance:Altitudesin Small ManufacturingBusinesses in SaudiArabia,Address
to the 1992 International Conference on Islamic Economics, International Institute for Islamic Thought,
Kuala Lumpur).
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Shariah-based commercial bank lending is thus inherently unable to
become a significant source of long-term capital," and, as it stands today, will
be unable to meet the Middle East's growing financing needs in coming
years. Though some demand for capital is being met by the growth of
Islamic units of western banks,S which are better able to match assets and
liabilities through their ability to participate in offshore interbank markets,
the most effective mechanism to raise Shariah-conforming long-term capital
in the coming years will be innovative techniques in the securitization and
pooling of capital.
VI. RECENT INNOVATIONS IN SHARm4-BASED FINANCIAL
SECURITIES

In response to the growing need for longer-term capital, the investment
banking arms of Western and Islamic banks have increasingly tried to fill the
void left by commercial banking activity by developing innovative financial
instruments 6 that are better able to attract Islamic capital than the more
traditional plain vanilla financing structures.87 The major examples of these
new financial instruments are the istisna structure, mudarabafunds, and the

muqaradabond.

A. The Istisna Structure
The istisna is a longer-term and larger credit vehicle than the previously
discussed jara88 In the istisna, the financier pays the supplier, who then
manufactures the plant or equipment, or purchases the commodities.89 The
client owes the bank the purchase price plus a predetermined markup, and
frequently a fee.' The typical structure is known as the "back-to-back
istisna," which finances the purchase of major manufactured goods such as

8
See VOGEL &HAYES, supra note 24, at 8.
as
See Albrecht, supra note 22, at 46. For example, Citicorp established Citi Islamic Investment
Bank in Bahrain in 1996 and ABN-AMRO opened its Global Islamic Financial Services unit in Bahrain
in 1997. J.P. Morgan & Co., Deutsche Bank, American Express, and ANZ Investment Bank have also
established Islamic units. See Iqbal, supra note 30, at 9; Stephen Timewell,A Market in the Making, THE

BANKER, Feb. 1, 1998, at 57.

See Islamic Finance, Islamic Windows of Opportunity, supra note 29, at 16.
See Khalili, supra note 58, at 19.
a
See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9.
9
See id.
90
See id. One example isthe $92 million istima bridge facility in the 1993, $1.8 billion Hub River
power project in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia's A]-Rajhi Bank bought the rights to the yet-to-be-produced
turbines and sold these rights to the project company on a markup basis. See id.
86
87
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ships or airplanes. 9' In the first istisna, the bank acts as a seller, accepting a
long-term schedule of payments from its customer, while in the second
istisna, the bank acts as a buyer, paying the manufacturer over a shorter period
with progress payments.' "The difference between the present value of
payments under the two contracts is the bank's compensation for the
finance."93
Initially used as avehicle to finance short-term working capital, the istisna
has expanded its role in recent years and is now the instrument of choice in
the growing field of Middle Eastern project finance. The istisna structure is
able to meet the need of typical project finance deals for long-term capital,
typically for eight to ten years. 9' The istisna is also well suited to the needs of
project finance because like most project finance deals, the istisna requires
lenders to take a stake in the project's cash flows and successful completion.9"
It should be noted, given the limited breadth of the Islamic capital
markets and the large size of most infrastructure projects, that most Shariahbased project finance deals are generally tranches of larger conventional
finance structures.' In the past, this produced inter-creditor problems
because the Islamic tranches, in istisna or other form, by not receiving
interest, might potentially receive principal repayment prior to the
conventional tranches in the deal.97 This issue has been resolved by ensuring
that an inter-creditor agreement clearly identifies different income streams
and establishes entitlements under each of them. 98 Most inter-creditor
agreements now require all senior lenders to be treated on aparipassubasis.9

See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 24, at 147.
See id.
93
Id.
9
See Angell & Kahlil, supra note 20, at 9.
95
See IslamicFinance,IslamicWindows of Opportunity,supra note 29, at 12. In most limited recourse
infrastructure projects, lenders require that at least 20-30% of aproject's overall financing be in the form
of straight equity. See Angell & Khalil, supra note 20, at 9.
96
See Islamic Finance,IslamicWindows of Opportunity, supranote 29, at 12. For example, the Equate
project in Kuwait, funded in 1996 and refinanced in 1997, had afive-tranche structure that included two
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B. MudarabaFunds
Another method of adhering to Shariah principles, while obtaining
sufficient funds to finance large-scale investments, is the mudarabafund,"°
aproject-specific pool of funds similar to a mutual fund."0 t Also known as
the two-tier mudaraba, " the mudaraba fund is an extension of the standard
mudaraba0 3 because the "[b]ank organizes investors' money into a mutual or
unit trust fund, and channels these funds into a mudaraba contract with a
fund manager."' t 4 "Most mudarabafunds operate as either closed or openended investment funds, with tradeable units. " " Mudaraba"[fQunds have
been used as a vehicle for bank syndications of large financings and to engage
in ventures too risky or too large for any single institution to take on alone,
such as holdings in oil tankers or real estate projects.""°
C. The MuqaradaBond
The last innovative Islamic financial structure to be examined in this
article is the muqaradabond, which is similar to the Western revenue bond.1°7
The muqaradais "[i]ssued by an existing company (which acts as mudarib) to
investors (who act as silent partners, or rabb al-mal) for the purpose of
financing a specific money-making project separable from the company's
general activities."" ° The profits of this separate activity are split according
to predetermined percentages." 9 An example of the muqarada is a bond
financing a bridge or tunnel project, whose toll revenues are then paid out to
the bondholders as their participation in the profits."' Though the muqarada
is religiously acceptable, to date it has been rarely used."' Nevertheless, the
muqarada could be a viable candidate to expand the range of Islamic
investment instruments in any instance where one could carve out a discrete
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activity with its own revenue stream.11 2 In the opinion of some Islamic
scholars, the muqarada could even be used when the organization
surrounding the discrete activity does not conform to Islamic principles just the activity itself would need to conform to Shariah. 3
VIL CONCLUSION

The Islamic financial markets currently provide an array of financial
instruments that conform to the Koranic prohibition of interest-based
lending. Though the first generation of securities served their purposes well
during the 1970s and 1980s, the 1990s saw a much greater need than before
for large amounts of long-term capital. This is particularly the case in the
area of project finance.
Both Western and Islamic financial institutions have responded by
creating several innovative financial structures, billions of dollars of which
have already been issued to either partially or fully fund several Middle
Eastern transactions and projects. Though even continued development of
Islamic securities is unlikely to ever satisfy all of the Middle East's future
capital requirements, this development has the potential to make accessible
vast amounts of untapped Islamic capital that has been awaiting appropriate
investment vehicles.
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